Libel, Part 1 - Last Few Cases

A few more cases to finish out our discussion of libel:

Masson v. New Yorker, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).

In this case, Jeffrey Masson, a projects director for the Sigmund Freud Archives, sues Janet Malcolm, a writer for the New Yorker magazine. He had been fired after his superiors began to dislike his criticism of Freud (if it's not one thing, it's my mother).

Malcolm conducts more than 40 hours of interviews with Masson for her article. Eventually, the article turns into a book, which paints an unflattering picture of Masson.

He claims he never said much of what Malcolm attributed to him. He also claimed that Masson fabricated quotes. Malcolm acknowledged making minor changes to the quotes.

Masson sues, arguing that when Malcolm changed and/or faked the quotes, she was guilty of actual malice. The lower court grants summary judgment sought by Malcolm. Masson appeals.

The key question: is changing a quote proof that a reporter "committed" falsity?

How would you rule?

The Supreme Court, 7-2, says that deliberately altering a quote does not equate with knowledge of falsity, unless the alteration causes a material change in the meaning of the statement. They send the case back to the appeals court, and instruct the judges there to determine whether the statements by Masson were defamatory, and whether Malcolm acted with actual malice.

Two trials were held - in the first, the jury couldn't agree on damages. In the second, the jury found that Malcolm did not act with actual malice. She believed that what she wrote was what Masspon told her.

The jury's verdict is later upheld by an appeals court panel.


Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, 8 F. 3d 1222 (1993)

A good test for truth is whether the libelous statement "would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced."

This brings us to Luther Haynes.

In 1991, author Nicholas Lemann writes a book, "The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How it Changed America." In it, he described how more than five million African Americans moved to the north between 1940 and 1970.

Lemann told the story of Ruby Lee Daniels - she left Mississippi and moved to Chicago. There, she met Haynes. They lived together and had children. Haynes held down a job.

Later, though, things get rough. Haynes is fired for drinking on the job, and was arrested for assaulting a police officer. He refused to support Ruby, and then walks out on she and their children.

Haynes sues the publisher of the book, Knopf, for libel. He admitted that many of the statements were true, but argued that three were false.

The lower court grants Knopf's motion for summary judgment - Haynes appeals.

The Eighth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals rules that even if some of the statements about Haynes were false, MOST were true. His reputation was damaged by the TRUTHFUL statements. The false statements did not hurt Haynes that much more.

No reasonable jury could find that Lemann's book was not SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE in its depiction of Haynes during the time he lived with Ruby.

Bottom line: if a statement or statements is/are substantially true, errors in detail are not actionable.

What are your thoughts about the court's ruling - does it seem fair, especially since the author got a few things wrong?


Lundell Manufacturing v. ABC, 98 F. 3d 351 (1996)

Remember that public figures must prove that an allegedly libelous statement was not truthful.

Private persons must prove falsity only when the subject of the statement is a matter of public concern based on the "content, form, and context" of the statement, says the Supreme Court.

Every word need not be false - only the part or parts that form the heart of the libel claim. Courts want SUBSTANTIAL TRUTH, as we saw in Haynes.

Here, Lundell Manufacturing, which manufactured garbage recycling machines, sued ABC after the network reported the dissatisfaction of residents in Berrien County, Georgia with the $3 million recycling machine that county officials had bought from Lundell.

On World News Tonight, a journalist noted that residents were angry that "they are stuck with a $3 million debt for this garbage recycling machine that they never approved and does not work."

ABC's attorneys argued that the reporter meant that the machine didn't work in the larger sense - it had not solved the county's garbage problem.

The jury thought otherwise - they believed that the report meant the machine didn't work and was defective. They award Lundell $1 million. The Eighth Circuit upholds the verdict. The Supreme Court refuses to hear ABC's challenge to the award.

ABC tried to argue that it had mistakenly treated Lundell as a public figure, not as a private figure/company.


Michaelis v. CBS, 119 F. 3d 697 (1997)

So what happens when someone is not acting in his/her official capacity? How does that change the path to a libel verdict?

Dr. Lazelle Michaelis was the coroner for Otter Tail County, Minnesota. She also had a private practice. She occasionally performed autopsies for the coroner in neighboring Becker County.

In one instance, Michaelis contended that the death of a young woman was a suicide. A local broadcast station, WCCO-TV, was critical of her in its report on the case. A reporter said, "we tried to talk with the doctor about her qualifications to handle a suspicious case like this one. She hung up on us. Twice."

Michaelis sues for libel, claiming that her reputation had been damaged.

The station argues that she was a public official, and had to prove actual malice.

Michaelis loses at the district court, but the Eighth Circuit reverses, ruling that she should be allowed to go to trial with her claims.

WCCO had not established that she was a public figure - here, she was not acting in her official capacity; she was acting in her "private practice" capacity at the Becker County Coroner's request. Her official position in Otter Tail County was not relevant.


Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858 (1998)

Be very afraid: 13 states have "agricultural disparagement" laws, which prevent the publication of lies about the fruits and veggies grown in those states.

Farmers can sue if a statement made by a reporter is not based on "verifiable fact or scientific or other reliable evidence."

You probably know much of the story from here: Oprah was sued in 1998 by a group of Texas cattle ranchers for violating the state's False Disparagement of Perishable Food Products Act.

A guest on her show claimed that thousands of head of cattle were infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy - "mad cow" disease.

Oprah announced firmly that she was giving up hamburgers. Lest you think her impact on the publishing industry is an illusion, cattle prices dropped significantly, which ticked the cattle ranchers off.

Folks wanted to test the constitutionality of the law, but it didn't get that far. The judge in the case, U.S. District Judge Mary Lou Robinson of Texas, held that the ranchers had not shown that cattle are "perishable food."

They also hadn't proven that Oprah had made "knowingly false" statements.

The Fifth Circuit agrees. Oprah had stoked the drama through editing and the omission of some facts, but the cattle ranchers simply had not shown that either she or her guests had made knowingly false statements.

They were "strongly worded" statements, but these were based on established fact.

She also made sure to balance the claims of her "mad cow" guest with the comments of an expert who talked about the safety of beef in the U.S.

You can't win a libel lawsuit for claims that simply put you in a bad light.

Would the ruling had been different if Oprah had not booked the other guest for "balance?"


Blumenthal v. Clinton, 992 F. Supp 44 (1998)

In an online column, Matt Drudge claimed that Sidney Blumenthal, an aide to President Clinton, abused his wife. Blumenthal sues Drudge and AOL, which, as an Internet Service Provider (ISP), made Drudge's column available to its subscribers.

Blumenthal sought $30 million in damages - a pretty large number for a one-person operation. Drudge printed a retraction two days after the original column appeared.

U.S. District Judge Paul Friedman reluctantly dismissed Blumenthal's claim against AOL. ISP's, he wrote, are not liable for materials created by others, but that they disseminate.

Do you agree with the judge here?

This holds true even when an ISP "has an active, even aggressive role" in making the content available - heavy promotion, for example.

Congress gave ISP's immunity as an incentive - so that they would police the internet for obscene and offensive material. Doesn't seem to have worked out too well.

Congress made no distinction between publishers and ISP's in providing immunity from liability under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA). If ISP's were subject to liability, they would face it every time they were made aware of any potentially defamatory statement.

They would not be able to keep their eyes out for offensive material, and would face "ceaseless choices of suppressing controversial speech or sustaining prohibitive liability."

As for Drudge, however, the court allowed Blumenthal's suit to continue. Drudge had argued that the court did not have jurisdiction. The judge, however, ruled that he did, citing DC's "long-arm" statute.

DC residents interacted with Drudge via his website; the site was distributed to DC residents via AOL, email, and the web; the site was available 24 hours a day; Drudge received contributions from DC residents, had done interviews with DC journalists, and had contact with sources in DC.


That's it for now - see you in class.